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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On April 4, 1988 Appellants filed a Notice to Appeal the 
judgment of the Second Judicial District Court denying 
Plaintiff/Appellant any rights, title or interest in and to 
the parcel of property listed in the Order, Judgment and 
Decree attached hereto as Appendix I. This court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3) (i) of the Utah Code, and Rule 5 of the Rules of 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal of this case are as follows: 
Whether the district court erred in finding that general 
language like "Subject to a fence line encroachment along the 
east line" can overrule the specific metes and bounds 
description of the deed; 
Whether the district court judge abused his discretion 
when plaintiff presented additional evidence and requested a 
new trial pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. That the trial court's decision be reversed and a 
judgment entered quieting title in plaintiff based upon the 
specific metes and bounds description of the deed. 
2. In the alternative, that the district court be 
required to hold another trial on the limited issue of the 
validity of the quit claim deed which grants the disputed 
property to the Plaintiff/Appellant herein. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The case at bar is a lawsuit between parties who claim 
an interest in a disputed parcel of property. The 
Appellant's interest to the property prior to trial was by 
way of a deed granted in 1973. 
Respondent's claim was created in 1979 when respondent's 
predecessor in title conducted a survey and requested the 
surveyor to describe the disputed parcel which would then be 
included on the respondent's deed description. 
After a trial by the district court the judge ruled that 
Appellant did not have an interest in the disputed parcel 
because of general language in her deed which said "Subject 
to a fence line encroachment along the east line" ignoring 
the more specific metes and bounds description contained in 
the deed which specifically describes the disputed parcel. 
Respondent, however, also had no interest because the 
court recognized the interest in Beth Carr Peterson, 
Appellant's predecessor in title. Appellant then obtained a 
quit claim to the disputed parcel from Beth Carr Peterson 
(now Hunter) from which Appellant attempted to get the 
district court to reopen the case to consider the claims of 
the parties. This was denied. 
B. Facts of the Case 
1. That Appellant has taken the property by deed dated 
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1973, which has a metes and bounds description with one final 
line that says: "Subject to a fenceline encroachment along 
the east line". (R. 231) 
2. That in 1973 a fence existed 34 feet west of the 
described east boundary and remnants of that fence existed at 
least up until 1986. (R. 232) 
3. That the Appellant paid the taxes on the land in 
question. (R. 233) 
4. That the Appellant was not aware of the fence, nor 
aware of a reference to the fence in a deed. (R- 233) 
5. That there was no finding of an agreement between 
the property owners that the fence should be the boundary but 
it was treated by the parties as such. (R. 232) 
6. That no ambiguity was found in the descriptions and 
deeds as recorded. (R. 232-3) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT POINT I - The appellant contends that specific 
language of a metes and bounds description controls over 
general language which may be in the deed. In the case at 
bar, the appellant's deed gives a grant to the disputed 
property by way of a specific metes and bounds description. 
Respondent claims title to the disputed portion through the 
broadened description conveyed by its predecessor in title. 
Respondent's predecessor in title created this new descrip-
tion by surveying to a delapidated fence line which by the 
surveyor's own recollection consisted partially along Appel-
lant's east property line. Appellant's deed had the general 
language at the end which stated "Subject to the fence line 
encroachment along east line." It is this general language 
that respondent relies upon in an attempt to claim the 
disputed section. 
ARGUMENT POINT II - Appellant contends that she should be 
granted relief to modify or amend the judgment under Rules 59 
and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT POINT III - The Appellant contends that the district 
court abused its discretion by not granting appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration under Rules 59 and 60. This 
because the evidence produced at the hearing on the motion 
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conclusively decides the issues or at least makes it 
judicially expedient that the court open up the trial for the 
limited issue associated with the new evidence presented. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF A METES AND 
BOUNDS DESCRIPTION CONTROLS OVER GENERAL 
LANGUAGE WHICH MAY BE IN THE DEED. 
In the case of Neeley v. Kelsch, Ut, 600 P. 2d 979 
(1979), the common grantor of the parties, [common grantor is 
significant because standards for a proper conveyance are 
relaxed. See gen. Winans v. Ross, 666 P. 2d 908 (Wash. App. 
1983)], Neeley and Kelsch, was a Corbet who owned a parcel of 
land with a country road bisecting the land into a north and 
south portion. By warranty deed she granted to Kelsch a 
certain described parcel set forth in metes and bounds with a 
general reference at the end stating: "The parcel consists 
of all land lying north of the country road which, in 
actuality, is approximately 15 acres instead of 22 acres." 
Neeley, by way of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, had 
contracted to purchase all of the lands lying south of the 
country road. However, the description by metes and bounds 
included two portions of land that lay on the north side of 
the road which had not been conveyed in the first instance to 
Kelsch. The trial court found for Kelsch and against Neeley 
but the Utah Supreme Court overturned that decision stating 
that they had not proven a mistake by clear and convincing 
evidence and then referred to the language on the deeds 
specifically: "All that land lying north of the country 
road. . . .", which conflicted with the metes and bounds 
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description. The court ruled in relevant part: 
The specific description in chains and 
degrees prevails over the general ref-
erence to the country road, for here the 
country road is not referred to as a 
monument. Also, when the face of a deed 
shows the intention was to convey a 
specific quantity of land and the metes 
and bounds would give that quantity but a 
reference to a monument would embrace 
more or less than the quantity, the metes 
and bounds description should be 
followed. 
600 P.2d at 982. (Citations.) First, this case Kelsch and 
Neeley title was conveyed from a common grantor which relaxes 
the standard somewhat for a boundary by acquiescence claim. 
Second, occupation was shown from 1942 to 1979. Third, 
conveyor testified that the intention was to convey the 
disputed land to Kelsch and not to Neeley. Fourth, taxes 
were paid by metes and bounds description. And finally, 
reference was made in the Kelsch deed to property north of 
the country road. Still the court found for Neeley clearly 
establishing that general verbage in a deed must give way to 
the specific metes and bounds description. 
12 Am Jur 2d Boundaries § 64 states: "[A] particular is 
preferred over, and will control or limit, a general 
description. . . . . In the case of inconsistent descriptions 
of land of equal certainty, the grantee is usually considered 
as being entitled to hold under the one which is most 
beneficial to him." 
In the case at bar, there is a specific description of 
property to Mrs. Hancock. The immediately preceding deed in 
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the Hancock chain of title is the Quit Claim from Ella M. 
Erskine to Beth E. Carr. There is no reference to the fence. 
Neither is there reference to the fence in any other deeds in 
the Hancock chain of title. This court could infer that the 
deed from Beth Carr Peterson to Hancock merely placed the 
"Subject to a fence line" as a protection to her for the 
warranty she was giving Hancocks on the property. Without 
the added words she may have found herself liable to Hancocks 
if the property owners to the east succeeded m claiming the 
land. To look at it as anything more does not make sense. 
There has never been until 1979, any claim to the 
disputed property by defendant. The wording in the Hancock 
deed which says "Subject to the fencelme encroachment along 
east line" can only be termed as general wording and not as 
specific as the metes and bounds description, therefore, it 
must be stricken from the warranty deed and be of no avail. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE GRANTED RELIEF TO 
MODIFY OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT UNDER RULES 
59 AND 60 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Under Rule 59(a)(4) Appellant is entitled to request a 
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence which could 
not have been discovered with due diligence at the time of 
the trial. The quit claim deed serves as such evidence. 
While it was created after the trial and entry of the 
judgment it is substantive evidence of what Beth Carr 
Peterson's intent was when she originally conveyed the 
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property. 
One main issue in the trial was what the term "Subject 
to a fence line encroachment" meant. Appellant exhaustively 
searched for Beth Carr Peterson and thought she was dead. 
After the judgment, Beth Carr was located. While the deed 
was not in existence at the time of trial, it is good 
substantive evidence of what the intent was, which was not 
presented as evidence at trial. 
Also, 59(e) Appellant has the right to ask that the 
judgment be opened and amended, with limited issues being 
reheard before the judge. 
Rule 60(b) 5, 6 and 7 have effect. First, 5 because 
with the quit claim deed arguably the judgment is void. 
Second, 6 because with the quit claim deed the judgment is 
arguably no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application. And if neither 5 nor 6 applies then 
7 allows any other reason justifying relief. Appellant 
contends that the quit claim deed is ample justification to 
rehear at least some of the issues or allow respondent to 
cross claim, counterclaim or bring in a third party. 
Anything could have been done to resolve the issues but the 
district court should not have ignored the quit claim deed 
and compelled this appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT 
GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION UNDER RULES 
59 AND 60. 
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The facts in the case at bar show Hancock owning a piece 
of property containing the phrase "Subject to a fence line 
encroachment along the east line." This was first placed in 
the Hancock deed and existed nowhere prior to the Hancock 
deed. 
Beth Carr Peterson was the grantor on the Hancock deed. 
She has since remarried and her name now is Beth E. Hunter. 
At the time of the trial Appellant had made an exhaustive 
search for her but could not find her. Appellant assumed she 
was dead. 
When the district court rendered its decision that Beth 
Carr Peterson may still have an interest in the property, 
immediately Appellant's search for either Beth Carr Peterson 
or an heir began with greater intensity. She was to be 
located noplace. Finally, out of a freak accident, 
Appellant's investigator was knocking on door after door in 
the neighborhood when she came across Beth Carr Peterson, now 
Beth E. Hunter. 
A quit claim was executed, ten dollars exchanged hands 
and the Appellant filed motions timely for relief from the 
judgment. Affidavits accompanied the motion as required. 
The affidavits were not seriously contested by respondents. 
They showed up at the hearing arguing that hypothetically 
this or this or another thing could have happened but gave no 
sworn response to the affidavits on file. 
- 10 -
Appellant feels at the very least respondents should 
have been required to respond in affidavit form to raise 
issues they thought pertinent as required for Motions for 
Summary Judgment. See generally Callioux v. Proggressive 
Insurance Company, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (1987). 
The district judge abused his discretion by not 
requiring such. And to require Appellant to reinstitute a 
lawsuit against respondent on the same grounds serves no just 
purpose. 
The court's ruling was fairly specific. With the quit 
claim deed and the court's ruling it was obvious that 
respondent had no claim to the property. And without 
affidavits sworn by respondent as to why the quit claim may 
be defective or of no effect defeats justice, prolongs 
litigation and increases the parties' expenses. 
This court has stated: "[W]hen it appears that the 
processes of justice have been so completely thwarted or 
distorted as to persuade the court that in fairness and good 
conscience the judgment should not be permitted to stand, 
relief should be granted." Haner v. Haner, Utah, 373 P. 2d 
577 at 578 (1962) . 
In the case of Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 
Utah, 590 P.2d 309 (1979) this court decided a case which 
dealt with a properly filed motion for a new trial. This 
court reversed the district court's refusal to alter or amend 
the judgment. The court stated in relevant part: 
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Where there is no jury, however, the 
Court, rather than granting a full new 
trial, may, under Rule 59(a) '... open 
the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings 
of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions and direct 
the entry of a new judgment.' 
Here, petitioner alleged two of 
those grounds and the District Court 
erred in denying the motion on the ground 
that the procedure was improper, rather 
than ruling on the merits. 
590 P.2d at 310, 311. 
The case at bar properly brought seeks to determine 
ownership to property. In fairness to the parties, 
especially the Appellant, there is no reason not to open the 
trial limited to issues surrounding the quit claim deed if 
they legitimately exist. 
What benefit is served by not granting Appellant's 
motion for a new trial based upon the quit claim deed? It 
only serves to hinder and delay the inevitable decision which 
needs to responsibly be made about the ownership to the 
property in question. Appellant was not barred from 
reinstituting the lawsuit to quiet title based upon the new 
deed. But to file a new action, serve defendants all over 
again, engage in discovery and retry the entire case seems to 
be the least judicially efficient. It only would delay the 
outcome and increase significantly the costs of litigation. 
The court's decision to not reopen the case for this new 
limited issue is a clear abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the specific metes and bounds 
description of her deed should control the general language 
"Subject to a fence line encroachment along the east line." 
This is the only conceivable handicap to Appellant's deed. 
The trial court, upon limiting the Appellant's ownership 
to less than the specific metes and bounds and basically 
leaving the parcel vested with Beth Carr Peterson (Hunter), 
should have then considered the grant by quit claim from Beth 
Carr Peterson (Hunter) which occurred subsequent to the 
court's ruling. 
The district court should be required to spare litigants 
the cost and expense of the court system when a more 
judicially and legally economical, efficient process is 
available. Under such circumstances the court can and should 
consider the evidence. Not to do so when it serves no 
purpose is an abuse of discretion. 
The description should be as specifically described or 
the district court should be required to rehear the specific 
issues associated with the quit claim deed and render a 
ruling. 
DATED this / /^clay of \J 14 
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Recorded Bo^o-U-
Pag. \7 . . .* .? .£ . 
Indexed 
LaVar E. Stark #A3080 
Attorney for Defendant 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3646 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNT! 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
FAYE HANCOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLANNED HOME DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendant, : Civil No. 88795 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
This matter came on regularly for trial on 
Wednesday, the 9th day of December, 1987 before the Honorable 
David E. Roth, Judge, presiding without a jury ab the 
Municipal Building, Ogden, Weber Cjounty, State of Utah, and 
Plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record, J. Paul 
Stockdale and Defendant was represented by its counsel of 
record, LaVar E. Stark and the Court, having reviewed the 
file, received the stipulation of the parties, heard the 
witnesses, examined the documentary evidence and having heard 
the arguments of counsel and having taken the matter under 
advisement and reviewed the memoranda of authority submitted 
APPENDIX I 
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Recorded B6bK[j[A. 
Page 
Indexed 
by the parties and being fully advised in the premises, and 
the Court having made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
separately stated and based thereon, now makes the following 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE: 
As between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff has 
no right, title or interest in and to the following described 
piece of property situate in Weber County, State of Utah, to-
wit: 
A part of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 16, Township 6 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. 
Survey: Beginning at a point 1276.21 
feet South 0 degrees 38^7" West along 
the Quarter Section line from the North-
east Corner of said Quarter Section; 
running thence West 31 • 60 feet to aij^ . 
existjLng fence as located by survey in 
1978; thence North 0 degrees 38f07w East 
131.00 feet along said fence; thence East 
31.60 feet to the Quarter Section line; 
thence South 0 degrees 38t07ft West 131.00 
feet along said line to the point of 
beginning. 
DATED this 7 day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ch fc> day of <^^^<Jo^ , 
19 QQ, I mailed the original and nine copies to the Supreme 
Court of Utah, and four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
LaVar E. Stark 
2485 Grant Ave., 200 , 
Karen L. Evans/Secretary 
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